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Abstract. The construction of reciprocal relationships requires coop-
erative interactions during the initial meetings. However, cooperative
behavior with strangers is risky because the strangers may be exploiters.
In this study, we show that people increase the likelihood of coopera-
tiveness of strangers by using lightweight non-risky interactions in risky
situations based on the analysis of a social network game (SNG). They
can construct reciprocal relationships in this manner. The interactions
involve low-cost signaling because they are not generated at any cost to
the senders and recipients. Theoretical studies show that low-cost sig-
nals are not guaranteed to be reliable because the low-cost signals from
senders can lie at any time. However, people used low-cost signals to
construct reciprocal relationships in an SNG, which suggests the exis-
tence of mechanisms for generating reliable, low-cost signals in human
evolution.
Keywords: Data Mining, Human Cooperation, Reciprocal Altruism,
Signaling, Social Network Game
1 Introduction
Evolutionary game theory research has shown that reciprocal altruism drives
the evolution of cooperation [31,12,15,14,1,2,20]. In this behavior, an individual
acts in a manner that temporarily reduces its fitness, while increasing another
individual’s fitness, with the expectation that the other individual will behave
in a similar manner at a later time. This behavior has been observed in hu-
mans [8,9,19] and other primates [17]. In addition, the possibility of this behavior
has even been suggested in vampire bats [33] and fishes [4].
Axelrod [2] showed that cooperation based on reciprocity requires friendly
interactions during the initial meeting in simulations of the iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma game. Because reciprocal cooperators cooperate with individuals who
cooperated with them previously. Indeed, experimental studies using game the-
ory have shown that humans tend to be cooperative in their first meetings with-
out prior interactions [19,9,32,18].
However, an interaction with strangers can be risky because it is difficult to
know each other’s levels of cooperativeness. Therefore, mechanisms for coopera-
tion (kin selection [10], direct reciprocity [31,12,15,1,2], indirect reciprocity [16],
and tags [21]) generate a structured interaction where individuals interact more
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frequently with acquaintances because strangers may be exploiters. Nonetheless,
humans tend to be cooperative during their first meetings without prior inter-
actions [19,9,32,18]. The evidences [2,19,9,32,18] has been acquired in modeled
environments based on the constrained behaviors of humans, or agents, to ex-
plicitly analyze their social behavior, e.g., they had to select their strategies
without prior interactions. However, in the real world, we engage in lightweight
preliminary interactions, such as observing, eye contact, bowing, and greeting
each other. Therefore, it is important to study these preliminary interactions in
a less restrictive environment than that imposed in experimental studies.
In this study, we analyzed the interactions during initial meetings to un-
derstand risk reduction behavior in the construction of reciprocal relationships
in a social network game (SNG). In the game, numerous players can behave
more freely than possible in the environments used in previous theoretical and
experimental studies [14,20], i.e., they did not need to select from a sequence
of several alternatives because they always had multiple alternatives and the
actions of all the players can be recorded. In addition, the following features of
the SNG make it easier to analyze reciprocal relationships. The game allows real
players to cooperate and compete with others in situations where the player’s
benefit is represented by a quantitative value, such as a payoff in game theory. A
previous study [29] demonstrated the existence of reciprocal relationships where
cooperators had more advantages than non-cooperators in this SNG.
Many previous studies have used data obtained from interactive online games,
particularly in social science [5,3,25,24,26,27,29,28], e.g., the dynamics of virtual
world economics [5,3], human migration behavior [24,27], gender differences in
social behavior [26], and reciprocal cooperation [29]
2 Materials and Methods
In this section, we provide the minimal SNG information and we define coop-
erative behavior in the SNG (see appendices A.1, A.2, and A.3 for the game
information, rules, and definition, respectively).
We analyzed cooperative behavior in the SNG, “Girl Friend BETA,” where
players acquired “event points” and competed in the rankings based on these
points because the players received better awards as their rankings increased
(Fig. 1). This SNG was released on 10/29/2012. The player’s ranking order was
determined by the sum of event points obtained in the period from 3/25/2013
to 4/8/2013.
Players must use their energy to obtain event points; therefore, the number of
actions by player is finite. There are two methods for replenishing these points:
waiting for the points to replenish over time and using a paid item. Players
must use their resources (items and time) in an effective manner to progress to
a higher ranking because their time and money are finite.
Players belong to groups and they must cooperate with each other to play the
game efficiently. The groups are limited to 1–50 players. The SNG was designed
to ensure that cooperation with group members results in more effective game
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Fig. 1. Overview of players’ interaction. Player A acts to acquire “event point”, then
player B belonging to a same group can cooperate for A. They can communicate each
other at any time by using three types of simple text messaging.
play. We filtered out players who did not belong to groups because most of the
active players must belong to groups to play effectively. Players can create groups
on their own. Others can apply to join groups at any time and then join a group
after the acceptance of their application by an administrator, who was typically a
group founder. Players can leave a group at any time and apply to join a different
group. We regarded this behavior as migration. The migrants were newcomers
for the existing group members. We regarded interactions between migrants
(newcomers) and the existing group members within 48 hours of migration as
initial meetings. Players can observe the behavior of members of their group
(e.g., attack on common enemies; the details are provided later) because the
game system showed their behavior on the game screen. We targeted groups of
five or more active players who logged in at least one or more times to analyze
their social interactions.
Players can communicate at any time using three types of simple text mes-
saging. The first type is a message from one player to another (direct messaging).
The second type is a message from a player to their group members (group mes-
saging). The third type is a posting on the forum for their group (forum posting).
These messages have no negative effects on either the senders or receivers, but
they also have few or no positive effects 1. We limited the data to intragroup
communication and cooperation.
We analyzed cooperative behavior in the environment described above. It
was difficult to track all of the cooperative behaviors because the players can
perform various actions in the SNG. Thus, we selected a specific cooperative
behavior and regarded the frequency of that behavior as a measure of a player’s
cooperativeness.
1 Players can acquire a few points for a lottery, which provides a card when the players
sent messages to each other at the beginning of each day. However, the players had
to pay 200 points to enter the lottery and the effect of the card is small, i.e., the
points do not increase the players’ abilities.
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Table 1. Payoff matrix for the leader game, where S + T > 2R and T > S > R > P ,
i.e., Pareto efficiency is achieved when one cooperates and the other does not cooperate.
The cooperator then obtains S and the noncooperator receives T .
Cooperation Noncooperation
Cooperation R,R S, T
Noncooperation T, S P, P
We focused on a game scenario where the relationship between players was
similar to that in the Leader game (Table 1), but it was not possible for both
players to cooperate at the same time in this scenario (see Appendix A.3). Pareto
efficiency is achieved in the Leader game when one player cooperates and the
other do not. The cooperator then receives S and the noncooperator receives T .
However, both try to avoid the worst situation (i.e., they receive P ), but they
also do not want to pay the cost for avoiding the worst situation (i.e., they do
not want to receive S), i.e., the players receive a high payoff by sharing S and
T in repeated plays of the game in a process known as ST reciprocity [30]. We
recognized this cooperative behavior, which provided a payoff T from one to the
other, as a cooperative behavior in this scenario.
3 Results
First, we evaluated the effects of social behavior on the number of cooperation
behaviors by others. We compared the social interactions by migrants (newcom-
ers) within 48 hours of migration and those by existing group members within 48
hours from a random time. We employed the following generalized linear model
(GLM) to analyze these data:
C′i ∼ NB(λi), (1)
lnλi = β1 ln aiHi + β2fi + β3fiCi + β4(1− fi)Ci +
β5figi + β6(1− fi)gi + β7fiGi + β8(1 − fi)Gi +
β9fibi + β10(1− fi)bi + β11tdti + β12.
This model was used to explain the number of cooperative behaviors from group
members to player i (C′i) based on a migrant flag fi (if i migrated, then fi = 1;
else fi = 0), an interaction between fi and their social behaviors (the number
of cooperative behaviors by i (Ci), the number of direct messages by i (gi), the
number of group messages by i (Gi), and the number of forum posts by i (bi)),
and trends in the cooperative behavior on day t (dti) as dummy variables. In
addition, we used the log of the product of the number of attacks by the group
members ai and the number of help requests from i to their group members (Hi)
because this value was expected to increase C′i proportionally if group members
cooperated at random (see Appendix A.3), i.e. this controls i’s group effect. dti
5was entered as covariates to control for the influence of each day. NB(x) shows
that x follows a negative binomial distribution. We estimated its parameters
with 80, 880 relationships between players, sampled at random. We considered
this model because the data exhibited over-dispersion when we applied the GLM
with a Poisson distribution.
Table 2 shows the results obtained after analyzing the model. The results
demonstrate that reciprocal relationships were constructed between a newcomer
and an existing group member, as well as being maintained between existing
group members, and that the three types of messages basically supported the
reciprocal relationships. In addition, the cooperative behavior of newcomers and
the three types of messages were more important for reciprocal relationships
than existing group members. The results also suggest that sending messages
to others may have demonstrated the cooperativeness of players in this SNG,
and the construction of reciprocal relationships required more cooperation and
communication than the maintenance of reciprocal relationships.
Second, we tested whether the three types of messages showed the cooper-
ativeness of the players. We analyzed the relationships between the messaging
behavior and cooperative behavior of migrants within 48 hours of migration and
of the existing group members within 48 hours of a random time. We employed
the following GLM to analyze the results:
Ci ∼ NB(λi), (2)
lnλi = β1 ln aiH
′
i +
β4figi + β5(1− fi)gi + β6fiGi + β7(1 − fi)Gi +
β8fibi + β9(1− fi)bi + β10tdti + β11.
This model was used to explain the number of cooperative behaviors by player
i (Ci) based on the interaction between a migrant flag fi (if i migrated, then fi
= 1; else fi = 0) and their messaging behavior (the number of direct messages
by i (gi), the number of group messages by i (Gi), and the number of forum
posts by i (bi)), and the trends in cooperative behavior on day t (dti) as dummy
variables. In addition, we used the log of the product of the number of attacks
by player i, ai, and the number of help requests from their group members (H
′
i)
to i because this value was expected to increase Ci proportionally if player i
cooperated at random (see appendix A.3), i.e. this controls i’s group effect. dti
was entered as covariates to control for the influence of each day. We estimated
its parameters with 80, 880 relationships between players, sampled at random.
NB(x) shows that x followed a negative binomial distribution. We employed this
model because the data exhibited over-dispersion when we applied the GLM
with a Poisson distribution.
Table 3 shows the results obtained after analyzing the model. The results
demonstrate that the messages sent between players basically indicated their
cooperativeness. The results also suggest that the use of messaging by newcomers
indicated greater cooperativeness than that by existing group members. Thus,
the messaging behavior may not have been important for existing group members
who had already constructed reciprocal relationships.
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Table 2. Results of the regression analysis based on the effects of social behavior
relative to the number of cooperative behaviors by others (eq. 1). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
that the signs of the regression coefficients did not change in Wald-type 99.9%, 99%,
and 95% confidence intervals, respectively (the symbols have the same meaning in the
following tables). The regression coefficient of fi, fiCi, (1−fi)Ci, figi, (1−fi)gi, fiGi,
(1 − fi)Gi, and fibi were positive and significant, even after controlling for the other
explanatory variables. The positive coefficient of fi shows that newcomers tended to
cooperate more than existing group members. The regression coefficients of Ci, gi, Gi,
and bi were positive regardless of whether fi = 1 was or not, and those for fi = 1 were
larger than those for fi = 0 (excluding the forum posts by existing group members,
which was not significant).
Explanatory Variable Regression Coefficient Standard Error
ln aiHi 0.7836054 (0.0052732)
∗∗∗
fi 4.9450949 (0.0363335)
∗∗∗
fiCi 0.1642087 (0.0068994)
∗∗∗
(1− fi)Ci 0.1018723 (0.0019206)
∗∗∗
figi 0.0079778 (0.0008424)
∗∗∗
(1− fi)gi 0.0004976 (0.0002189)
∗
fiGi 0.0941003 (0.0111839)
∗∗∗
(1− fi)Gi 0.0494162 (0.0069425)
∗∗∗
fibi 0.0170395 (0.0046058)
∗∗∗
(1− fi)bi -0.0002771 (0.0015286)
d1 0.3258377 (0.0507144)
∗∗∗
d2 0.5307506 (0.0508597)
∗∗∗
d3 0.7443556 (0.0513828)
∗∗∗
d4 0.7133664 (0.0506845)
∗∗∗
d5 0.8200644 (0.0500531)
∗∗∗
d6 0.9167403 (0.0502217)
∗∗∗
d7 0.9726432 (0.0511331)
∗∗∗
d8 0.9641601 (0.0520516)
∗∗∗
d9 1.0840990 (0.0519211)
∗∗∗
d10 0.9394478 (0.0529310)
∗∗∗
d11 0.8924624 (0.0513280)
∗∗∗
d12 1.0503286 (0.0503736)
∗∗∗
d13 1.3767783 (0.0532730)
∗∗∗
d13 2.3644593 (0.0793361)
∗∗∗
Intercept -8.9843031 (0.0666115)∗∗∗
7Table 3. Results of the regression analysis based on the relationships between mes-
saging behavior and cooperative behavior (eq. 2). The regression coefficients of figi,
(1− fi)gi, fiGi, (1− fi)Gi, fibi, and (1− fi)bi were positive and significant, even after
controlling for the other explanatory variables. The coefficients of gi, Gi, and bi were
positive regardless of whether fi = 1 was or not, and those for fi = 1 were larger than
those for fi = 0.
Explanatory Variable Regression Coefficient Standard Error
ln aiH
′
i 0.3797530 (0.0040444)
∗∗∗
figi 0.1232340 (0.0008722)
∗∗∗
(1− fi)gi 0.0109966 (0.0002245)
∗∗∗
fiGi 0.3422500 (0.0116456)
∗∗∗
(1− fi)Gi 0.1180049 (0.0071251)
∗∗∗
fibi 0.2045634 (0.0046320)
∗∗∗
(1− fi)bi 0.0474698 (0.0015434)
∗∗∗
d1 0.1919667 (0.0516471)
∗∗∗
d2 0.4586802 (0.0516397)
∗∗∗
d3 0.6671087 (0.0524117)
∗∗∗
d4 0.6931665 (0.0516168)
∗∗∗
d5 0.6556934 (0.0512680)
∗∗∗
d6 0.7007019 (0.0515783)
∗∗∗
d7 0.6928495 (0.0527448)
∗∗∗
d8 0.7550984 (0.0534660)
∗∗∗
d9 0.7368654 (0.0538759)
∗∗∗
d10 0.6794663 (0.0548714)
∗∗∗
d11 0.6930345 (0.0529291)
∗∗∗
d12 0.7449962 (0.0519552)
∗∗∗
d13 0.6131128 (0.0551394)
∗∗∗
d13 0.6985565 (0.0824675)
∗∗∗
Intercept -4.8263750 (0.0550812)∗∗∗
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4 Discussion
In the present study, players constructed reciprocal relationships in a similar
manner to those found in studies based on modeled environments [2,19,9,32,18].
We showed that lightweight interactions (three types of messages) were impor-
tant for constructing reciprocal relationships. The messages involved low-cost
signaling because they incurred no costs for the senders and recipients. Theo-
retical studies [22,23] have shown that low-cost signals are not guaranteed to be
reliable because the senders can lie at any time using low-cost signals. However,
we found that the messages sent by players demonstrated their cooperativeness
(i.e., their messages were reliable signals) and their messages helped to construct
and maintain their reciprocal relationships. In particular, the messages sent dur-
ing initial meetings (messages from newcomers to existing group members) were
more important than messages between existing group members. These results
suggest that low-cost signals will be reliable in humans. The signals may be em-
ployed to increase the likelihood of cooperativeness by others in risky situations
where they are not known to each other.
This evidence for low-cost signaling in humans provides insights into the
mechanisms that generate and maintain large societies. Players probably use
low-cost signals as a form of social grooming, which is used to construct and
maintain social relationships [6]. Apes, which are closely related to humans,
clean each other’s fur as a form of social grooming [13]. This social grooming
incurs high time costs for the groomers and provides hygiene benefits to the
recipients of grooming. Therefore, their social grooming will work as a reliable
signal. By contrast, social grooming by humans can be low cost such as the
three types of messages used in the SNG, as well as gaze grooming [11] and
one-to-many grooming (e.g., gossip) [7]. The form of social grooming practiced
by apes would be too costly for humans because human groups are larger ape
groups, so humans must invest time and effort in grooming others in different
ways to create social relationships in large groups [6]. Therefore, the evolution
of mechanisms that generate reliable signals will have facilitated the evolution
of the signature social structures found in humans.
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A Appendix
A.1 Game Information
We analyzed cooperative behavior in the SNG, “Girl Friend BETA.” Table A
presents the game information. In this SNG, players create individual decks of
cards that they collect and then use their decks to perform tasks in the SNG. A
powerful deck, constructed from powerful cards, provides an advantage for game
play in various situations. The players’ primary motivation in the SNG is to
obtain powerful cards. Players can obtain powerful cards as top-ranking rewards
(see details later) or by casting lots called “Gacha.”
Players can communicate at any time using three types of simple text messag-
ing. The first type was a message from one player to another (direct messaging).
The second type was a message from a player to their group members (group
messaging). The third involved posting on the forum for their group (forum post-
ing). These messages had no negative effects on either the senders or receivers,
but they also had few or no positive effects 2. We limited the data to intragroup
communication and cooperation.
2 Players can acquire a few points for a lottery, which provided a card when the players
sent messages to each other at the beginning of each day. However, the players had
to pay 200 points to enter the lottery and the effect of the card was small, i.e., the
points did not increase the players’ abilities.
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Table A. Game information
Developer and Publisher CyberAgent Inc.
Service Name Girl Friend BETA
URL http://vcard.ameba.jp
Event Type Raid Battle
Event Time Period 3/25/2013 16:00 to 4/8/2013 14:00
Analysis Time Period 3/25/2013 0:00 to 4/7/2013 23:59
A.2 Game Rules
Our analysis target was a raid event (Fig. A), in which players attack large
enemies3 and acquire “event points.” Players competed in the rankings based
on their event points, because they received better awards as their rankings
increased.
?????????
???????
??????????????????????????????????? ????
???????????
?????? ??????
???????????????????????????????
?????????????????
??????????
??????? ?????????????
??????????????????????
??????????????????????
???????????????????
Fig.A. Overview of raid event. A player conducts “quests” to find enemies (1). The
player begins a battle upon finding an enemy and then attacks the enemy to obtain
points (2). Enemies with very high hit points are strong; thus, they can call for help
from other group members whom they have helped to win the battle (3). Players who
helped had their point gain increased by 1.5 times (4). Players compete in rankings
based on their points (5).
Players conduct quests4 to find enemies during an event. Players begin battles
when they find an enemy and then attack the enemy to obtain points. However,
enemies with very high hit points are strong, making it difficult for players to win
these battles unaided. Thus, they can call for help from other group members, to
3 The enemy only has hit points as an attribute, meaning that players cannot be
attacked by enemies. A player must attack an enemy to acquire event points at the
expense of attack points.
4 This is one of the basic actions in SNGs. A player may encounter an enemy on
performing certain action.
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win the battle. Players who helped had their point gain increased by 1.5 times.
Therefore, players help their fellow group members to acquire more points.
Players’ point gains are proportional to the amount of damage caused during
attacks, i.e., more powerful decks earn more event points. A player immediately
acquires points upon attacking an enemy, even if the enemy is not defeated.
However, a player cannot battle another enemy while already battling another
enemy, and that enemies’ hit points increase with each battle; therefore, players
must attack enemies repeatedly in the latter half of an event. Thus, a player who
finds an enemy or helps a fellow group member must defeat the enemy before
taking a next action, or wait until that the enemy leaves5.
Players increase the amount of damage caused during their attacks by launch-
ing “combo attacks,” alternate attacks by two or more players in which the play-
ers need to launch attacks within ten minutes after other players6. The longer
a chain of combo attacks, the more acquisition points are acquired. Battling
enemies together with fellow group members increases the effectiveness of acqui-
sition points.
Players must use a quarter of their attack points to attack; thus, they can
attack four times when their point totals are full. There are two methods for
replenishing these points: wait for the points to replenish over time or use an
item that costs 100 JPY (such items are also sometimes distributed in the game
as rewards).
Thus, players must use their resources (items and time) effectively to progress
to a higher ranking, e.g., responding to a “help” request from their group mem-
bers to acquire a point gain increase of 1.5 times, increasing the number of
“combo attacks” to increase the amount of damage, and reducing the disable
time. We defined payment efficiency as the event points per payment, as in game
theory.
A.3 The Test Scenario
It was impossible to track every cooperative behavior, because players can ex-
hibit various behaviors in the SNG. Hence, we focused on one easily tracked
cooperative behavior, and we regarded its frequency as players’ cooperativeness.
We focused on the following scenario based on these rules to define players’
cooperativeness. a) An enemy is attacked by a player and fellow group members.
b) The enemy’s hit points are very few. In this scenario, players who defeat the
enemy will acquire only a few event points, because their attack power is higher
than the enemy’s hit points. Thus, their behavior is not efficient for acquiring
event points. By contrast, if the players’ attack power is lower than the enemy’s
5 The length of the disable time is set between one and two hours. It is too long to
complete the rankings for middle- and higher-rank players, because other players
progress in the rankings during their disabled time.
6 If a player sequentially attacks an enemy then the attack is not count for the “combo
attacks.” In addition, if players do not attack during ten minutes then their chain
of combo attacks are reset to 0.
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hit points, their behavior is efficient for acquiring event points. Furthermore,
they cannot battle another enemy, if battle with one enemy is ongoing, and
therefore must wait until they defeat the enemy to exhibit efficient behavior.
Table B. Payoff matrix for the test scenario consisting of two players and an enemy
with very few hit points. The player who attacks the enemy receives S, and the other
player receives T . If neither player attacks the enemy, then each receives P . Attack by
both players is impossible, because either player can defeat the enemy.
Attack Wait
Attack -, - S, T
Wait T, S P, P
In simple terms, consider that two players battled an enemy in this scenario,
where their relationship is represented in Table B. The relationship between the
variables is T > S > P in this payoff matrix. Attack is not efficient, when S
is less than T . However, if they do not attack the enemy, they waste time by
waiting for someone else to attack, i.e., P is lowest. It is not possible to cooperate
both players in this scenario, because an attack on the enemy by either player
immediately defeats the enemy. The values of this payoff matrix depend on each
players situation, e.g., the differences between the two attack powers7. In the
scenario, both try to avoid the worst situation (i.e., they get P ), but they also
do not want to pay the cost to avoid the worst situation (i.e., they do not want to
get S). This social dilemma is similar to the one in the “Leader game” (Table 1).
In that game, Pareto efficiency is achieved when one cooperates, and the other
does not. Then, the cooperator receives S, and the noncooperator T . That is,
players receive a high payoff by sharing S and T on repeated plays of the game,
a process known as ST reciprocity[30]. We recognized this cooperative behavior,
which provided the payoff T from one to the other, as a cooperative behavior in
this scenario.
Cooperative behavior is an inefficient attack, as shown in Table B; thus we de-
fine aij as the attack efficiency indicator: aij = eij/M(ei), where eij are the event
points in player i’s jth attack and M(ei) is the median of ei = {ei1, · · · , eiN}
(N is the frequency of player i’s attacks). We considered cooperative behavior
to be in the range of a ≤ 0.40. Accordingly, we define ci as the proportion of
cooperative behavior (ai ≤ 0.40) for player i. We regarded a cooperator as a
player where c ≥ 0.10.
7 In addition, it does not mean that the relationship between the payoffs is constant.
If a player is about to go to sleep, then S is larger than T , because the attack points
replenish the next morning.
